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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution was the idea 
that the public police must be answerable to the judicial branch if we are to avoid 
arbitrary and capricious governance. Judicial review of police conduct prevented 
the Constitution from becoming “revocable at the whim of any police officer who, 
in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.”1 The 
problem, the Court recognized, was the unchecked power of the police to interfere 
with the public at their pleasure.2 Without the judicial check, the Court recognized, 
policing becomes a state of nature:3 “If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy.”4 
                                                                
 * Professor and Leo J. O’Brien Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am grateful to Justin 
Levitt, Rachel Harmon, and John Rappaport for pushing me to more clearly articulate my thoughts on regu-
lating the police. I am also grateful to the editors of the Idaho Law Review for their hard work during the 
editing process. 
 1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 2. See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 55 (1997) (de-
scribing the elements of arbitrary government in terms of discretion to choose without responding to the 
affected party’s interests). 
 3. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88–89 (rev. student ed. 2012) (describing state of nature 
as “a warre . . . of every man, against every man”). 
 4. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (internal quotations omitted). 
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The Court’s regulatory regime relied upon the judicial branch to hold the po-
lice accountable. Judges provided a front-end check on the police, through the war-
rant process, by requiring them to obtain from a magistrate a “neutral predetermi-
nation” of the lawfulness of their proposed conduct.5 Judges also enforced a trial-
oriented back-end sanction—exclusion of evidence at trial—incentivizing the police 
to limit themselves to magistrate-approved conduct. Indeed, 
the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police 
conduct . . . and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent 
to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the con-
stitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would 
be a mere form of words.6  
One way to understand the Warren Court’s jurisprudence leading up to Terry 
v. Ohio, then, is as facilitating oversight by the judiciary of executive action. Standing 
guard over the police is the prime function of the warrant process.7 But asserting 
Fourth Amendment rights at trial has a more general role in bringing to light low-
visibility police conduct, so that the public can participate in the process of holding 
the police accountable, through the democratic political process.8 
Low-visibility policing is a method of social control that enables the police to 
act at their pleasure when deciding how to maintain or impose order on the 
streets.9 Courts and legislatures do not get to know “the substance of these ‘low 
visibility’ . . . [activities, so] they c[an]not correct, clarify, or constrain the[ir] bound-
aries.”10 Low-visibility policing, because it avoids judicial oversight, presents an ex-
istential challenge to the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment regime of judicial 
oversight of the police.  
The Terry Court recognized both that low-visibility policing was an important 
feature of the widespread harassment of racial minorities at the hands of the police, 
and that the Court was relatively powerless to do anything about it.11 Because low-
visibility policing targets only the socially marginal and vulnerable, few people out-
side of the affected groups may know or believe complaints of race-based policing, 
and so be willing to protest against it. And because low-visibility policing begins and 
ends on the street, the judiciary never gets to hold the police accountable for their 
conduct. Some institution other than the courts must fill this court oversight role, 
or the wrongs of low-visibility policing go unaddressed. 
                                                                
 5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). 
 6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the 
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far 
less reliable procedure on an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly 
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”).  
 8. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American 
Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 290 (2010) (discussing political processes by which poor and marginalized 
people can hold the police accountable).  
 9. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
1960S 192 (2016). 
 10. Id. at 193. 
 11. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1314. 
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One particular form of low-level harassment—the stop and frisk—occupied a 
central role as both a technique of racial harassment and low-visibility policing. One 
of the great disappointments for supporters of the Warren Court was its refusal to 
prohibit the police practice of stopping and frisking suspects on the street as a form 
of criminal investigation.12 Stop and frisk, the Court noted, caused a great deal of 
friction between the police and minority communities13—and continues to do so.14 
Despite the Court’s worries about the impact of stop and frisk on minority individ-
uals, the Court endorsed some version of that practice, prompting critiques of the 
Terry opinion as formalistic,15 or race-blind,16 or as conciliating the police.17 
In fact, the Court’s discussion of race often mirrors the radical language 
adopted by the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice in its famous report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,18 pub-
lished just one year earlier. That President’s Commission called for radical, top-to-
bottom reform of the police and its relationship to minority communities.19 The 
courts and the Constitution are relatively powerless to undertake this sort of radical 
reform.20 If Terry’s discussion of race and policing appears unsatisfying, that is be-
cause the Fourth Amendment’s ability to address racially-biased policing is unsatis-
fying. The interaction of race and policing is a complex problem with a long history 
and no easy solutions. Thanks in part to the President’s Commission, the Terry Court 
was well aware of that history.21 
The problem presented by Terry is simply that the criminal justice system is 
not an integrated system, but a fragmented one. One way it is fragmented, the Terry 
Court recognizes, is between crime control and public-order policing. Crime control 
has high-judicial visibility, allowing illegally-gained evidence to be excluded at trial. 
                                                                
 12. Id. at 22. 
 13. Id. at 14 n.11. 
 14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Terry's Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (2016) (reviewing the 
Terry doctrine in light of recent litigation investigating the use of stops and frisks in New York City). See also 
Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable 
Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry Stops, 16 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 883 (2013); David A. Harris, Frisk-
ing Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 44 (1994) (discussing vulnerability of Afri-
can-Americans to reasonableness-based stops and frisks); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—
Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 243, 
251 (1991); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990). 
 15. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop is Just a Stop: Terry's Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 113 (2017). 
 16. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reason-
ableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1150 (2012) (discussing perils of Terry’s “colorblind” model of criminal 
procedure); see also Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 956, 964 (1999). 
 17. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Dis-
cretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1285 (1998) (arguing that racial considerations “clearly occupied a subor-
dinate position to the Court's overriding concern about police safety and violent crime”). 
 18. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying injunctive relief to victim of police 
brutality for lack of standing). 
 21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968). 
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Public-order policing has low-judicial visibility. What happens on the street stays on 
the street, and rarely makes it to the courtroom. Read this way, Terry tells lawyers 
something uncomfortable. In a fragmented criminal justice system, there are some 
forms of police misconduct that the Court, and the exclusionary rule, just cannot 
remedy. Doing social activism through law is not enough. The Fourth Amendment 
lacks the resources to protect us from race-based policing. 
For the most part, the race-based criticism of Terry focuses, understandably 
enough, on the Court’s failure to engage with a race-conscious approach to the 
problems of race-based policing. Many of these critiques are urgent and important. 
However, in an attempt to place the blame for subsequent doctrinal novelties at 
the feet of the Terry Court, they generally embargo and explain away the Court’s 
explicit discussion of race-based policing and the Court’s references—express and 
implied—to the recently published Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.22  
To reclaim a sense of Terry’s powerful engagement with race and reasonable-
ness, I want to separate out Terry from its progeny and suggest that the Court was 
engaged in a conversation with the President’s Commission. I shall begin by discuss-
ing the President’s Commission’s radical critique of race-based policing and its even 
more radical recommendations for reform: recommendations that have largely 
been ignored and unfulfilled. I shall then explain how Terry’s approach to stop and 
frisk responds to race-based harassment by, not only adopting, but rendering more 
stringent, the President Commission’s recommendations on the use of stops and 
frisks. I shall suggest that Terry’s precise, rule-like approach to stop-and-frisk polic-
ing precludes its use as a device for low-level racial harassment and limits its use to 
investigating crimes of violence. This precision enabled the Court to tackle head-on 
a problem identified by both the Terry Court and the Report: the central place oc-
cupied by physical displays of police authority—often called “command pres-
ence”—to dominate racial minorities. I shall conclude by suggesting that critics frus-
trated at the way the reasonable suspicion standard has been co-opted by a pro-
police agenda miss the Court’s central regulatory claims. Three claims are particu-
larly important: (1) that there is not one criminal justice system, but many overlap-
ping systems; (2) that the police conduct is highly visible in minority communities; 
but (3) that same conduct is low visibility in the courts that are supposed to regulate 
their behavior. Constitutional litigation is thus a limited resource against the sort of 
low-visibility policing that remains separate from the process of criminal prosecu-
tion and so incapable of judicial oversight. 
II. RADICAL POLICING 
The police on patrol wield a distinctive type of authority. Certainly, they rep-
resent the state’s authority—indeed the authority of law as comprehensive, su-
preme, and effective. But unlike other legal officials—judges, prosecutors, and so 
on—police officers have the legal ability to deploy physical force to ensure conform-
ity with the law. In one sense, this authority is “high-visibility”: they patrol, search 
and seize, negotiate solutions to public order problems and so on, in full view of the 
                                                                
 22. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18.  The Terry opinion cites the President’s Commission Re-
port quite extensively. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11. 
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public.23 In another sense, however, their authority is “low-visibility,” because these 
activities occur out of the view of their supervisors (whether in the executive or 
legislative branches), and using situational and territorial expertise that neither 
their superiors nor the public possesses.  
I will briefly consider each of these features in turn: (1) that the police have a 
distinctive form of legal authority that they exercise over those civilians under their 
jurisdiction; (2) that they often exercise that authority with high-visibility in relation 
to the civilian subjects of their authority but (3) low-visibility in relation to the legal 
officials who could call them to account, and otherwise regulate that authority, as 
well as the general public, who lack the specialized knowledge that comes from po-
lice training and experience. 
A. Perspectives on Police Authority 
i. Distinctive Authority 
The police are distinctive in the sort of authority they claim over people and 
institutions within its jurisdiction. The police, as agents of the state, generally claim 
legal authority for their actions. However, other legal officials possess the power to 
interpret and apply the law within a given jurisdiction, over some range of individ-
uals. Only the police are given the power to maintain public order,24 and to back up 
that authority through "the baton and the gun."25 The classic statement of this po-
sition is Egon Bittner’s claim that “the police are nothing else than a mechanism for 
the distribution of situationally justified force in society.”26 While this definition of 
                                                                
 23. See, e.g., Charles H. Ramsey, The Challenge of Policing in a Democratic Society, in CRITICAL 
ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 596–97 (7th ed., Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert, eds., 
2015). 
 24. The patrol officer’s order-imposing authority may derive as much from their special compe-
tence to respond to disorder as from any particular rule. See, e.g., P.A.J. WADDINGTON, POLICING CITIZENS: 
AUTHORITIES AND RIGHTS 39 (1999) (describing the determinants of police decision-making in the context of 
public order policing as “not the law, but officers’ conception of social values to be authoritatively imposed 
. . . on those who are recalcitrant.”). See also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 372 (2012) (1689) 
(describing the broad prerogative power of the executive to maintain order and enforce the law). The Gov-
ernment in Terry attempted (unsuccessfully) to persuade the Court to endorse something like this power. 
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (characterizing the state as “argu[ing] that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and 
often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses . . 
. .” including an unconstrained power to stop and frisk suspects on the street). 
 25. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL PROCESS AND CULTURAL OBSESSION 74 
(1991).  
 26. EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF BACKGROUND FACTORS, 
CURRENT PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 39 (1970). Bittner elsewhere argued that, “The policeman, and 
the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may 
have to be used, to meet it.” Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the 
Police, in POLICING: KEY READINGS 150, 165 (Tim Newburn ed., 2008). See also e.g., ROBERT REINER, POLICING, 
POPULAR CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: TOWARDS A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC CRIMINOLOGY 58 (2011) (“The distinc-
tiveness of the police lies not in their performance of a specific social function, but in being the specialist 
repositories for the state’s symbolic monopolization of legitimate force in its territory.”). For an alternative 
view, see JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 1920 (1996). 
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police authority is perhaps somewhat simply stated,27 it contains more than a kernel 
of truth and is widely accepted as accurate.28 
ii. High-Visibility Authority 
A second feature of patrol-police authority is that it is public and exposed, 
determined by status and location. In part, police authority is embodied by the uni-
form or the badge, which both represents and broadcasts the officer’s status as a 
governmental official. However, patrol police authority also depends upon how the 
police conduct themselves in public.29 The physical embodiment of this type of au-
thority is referred to as “[c]ommand presence[:] . . . a quality that conveys supreme 
authority, confidence, competence, and the physical ability to back it up.”30 In ser-
vice of the publicly broadcast model of authority, “[p]olice officers dress, walk and 
talk in ways they feel create and enhance command presence.”31 The point of com-
mand presence is to take control of the public spaces that constitute police terri-
tory.32 
The flip-side of highly-visible authority, however, is intolerance of invigilators, 
especially civilians on the street who might see fit to challenge the officer’s author-
ity.33 Command presence demands public deference to that authority and compli-
ance with the officer’s directives.34 Losing command authority during an interaction 
with a member of the public amounts to a personal and institutional disgrace.35 The 
stakes of such a confrontation are high:  
                                                                
 27. I, for one, would quibble with the “nothing else” aspect of the formulation. See, e.g., Eric J. 
Miller, A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial, in OBSTACLES TO FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 239 (John D. Jackson & Sarah J. Summers eds., 2018) (discussing the role of the police). 
 28. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Reconsidering Criminal Procedure: Teaching the Law of the Police, 
60 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 391, 398400 (2016) (citing Bittner, supra note 26, approving Bittner’s force-based under-
standing of police authority); see also WADDINGTON, supra note 24, at 1516 (“[A] consensus has emerged 
in police research that the essence of policing lies not in what police do but in their potential, specifically 
their potential to use legitimate force”). 
 29. KLEINIG, supra note 26, at 19; Ramsey, supra note 23, at 597 (describing the way in which the 
police learn to regard the badge as a symbol—a bright and highly visible symbol—of the authority and the 
trust that the public places in them). 
 30. JOAN C. BARKER, DANGER, DUTY, AND DISILLUSION: THE WORLDVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE OFFICERS 69 
(1999). 
 31. Id. at 70. 
 32. See, e.g., SCHEINGOLD, supra note 25, at 74 (discussing ways in which “[t]he police are orga-
nized to control the streets and the successful patrolman is an informal specialist in street use. He combines 
his knowledge of local behavior with his conception of how the public streets are used to analyze and per-
form many of his routine obligations."); see also John Van Maanen, The Asshole in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 143 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert, eds. 7th ed., 2017) (discussing police 
territoriality).  
 33. On contestatory citizens as invigilators of state power, see PETTIT, supra note 2, at 22526. 
 34. See, e.g., WADDINGTON, supra note 24, at 17 (“data demonstrates just how thin is the veneer 
of civility in police-public encounters and that the maintenance of civility relies on members of the public 
deferring to the authority of the police . . . if they refuse, then the coercive underpinnings of that authority 
are clearly revealed, especially when police authority is publicly and visibly challenged[.]”). 
 35. See, e.g., Van Maanen, supra note 32, at 147 (“Activity which may threaten the perceived 
order becomes intolerable, for it signifies to the patrolman that his advantage over the conduct of others 
(his “edge”) is in question. It is a source of embarrassment in front of a public audience, and sometimes it is 
considered a disgrace to the police uniform if it is viewed by one’s peers or departmental superiors.”). 
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when the authority of an officer is questioned by a member of the non-
police public, the officer has three broad responses available to him. He 
may (1) physically attack the offender; (2) swallow his pride and ignore the 
offender; or (3) manufacture a false excuse for the arrest of the offender.36 
 Accordingly, a willingness to assert authority over recalcitrant civilians just in 
virtue of their recalcitrance is an omnipresent threat behind every police-civilian 
interaction.37 In a classic article on police responses to civilian challenges, John Van 
Maanen describes the process as moving from affront, where the civilian challenges 
public police authority; to clarification through confrontation, as the police officer 
tries to determine whether the civilian is likely to continue to resist the police, or is 
likely to turn to cooperation; and finally to the remedial phase, which metes out 
some form of degradation ceremony upon the civilian as a means of reasserting 
police authority.38 These sanctions may be some form of threat, ridicule, or harass-
ment, or some other form of street justice.39 
iii. Low-Visibility Authority 
Despite the high visibility of police activity to observers on the street, that ac-
tivity is rarely observed or reported to the various institutions charged with regu-
lating police activity and holding patrol police accountable.40 Institutionally, public-
order policing is a “low-visibility” activity. Before the advent of police-worn body 
cameras and mobile phones, police supervisors were constrained to take police of-
ficers at their word whenever the public complained about street justice or degra-
dation ceremonies. For the most part, what the police officer said happened during 
an encounter became the official version, whatever the truth.41 Low-visibility polic-
ing, by its very nature, devolves a form of discretionary “final-authority” power to 
the patrol officer to determine how to respond to situations that arise on the 
street.42 
Regulatory problems are particularly pressing when scrutiny is difficult or ac-
countability unenforceable. That is often the case when policing begins and ends 
upon the street, rather than moving through the stationhouse to the courthouse.43 
Much of low-level policing is resolved by the police on the spot and rarely results in 
                                                                
 36. Id. at 149. 
 37. See, e.g., PETER K. MANNING, DEMOCRATIC POLICING IN A CHANGING WORLD 34 (2010) (describing 
policing as about “making use of the capacity and authority to overpower resistance”). 
 38. Van Maanen, supra note 32, at 154. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See generally Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). 
 41. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON, REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK 23 (1991) 
(“[Police] versions of the truth are routinely accepted by other criminal control agents, who usually have 
neither the time nor the resources to consider competing truths.”). 
 42. On final authority discretion, see Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 29, 49 (1997) (describing a type of discretion where a decision cannot be reviewed or reversed by 
some superior). 
 43. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 27. 
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a formal arrest or prosecution. According to a former police officer-turned-crimi-
nologist P.A.J. Waddington, “For most potential offenders justice is dispensed not 
in court, but on the streetcorner; not by a judge, but by a police officer.”44 The sanc-
tion is often routine harassment and intimidation of civilians.45 
Crime control, as compared with street policing, is a high-visibility activity. 
Criminal investigation allows officials outside the police department to interrogate 
police investigatory techniques. A feature of the Warren Court was rendering oth-
erwise low-visibility policing more visible to the courts, and so more amenable to 
judicial oversight. Terry represents the limits of that process when confronted with 
a fragmented system of policing. 
B. The President’s Commission and Police Authority 
So far, I have suggested that policing presents problems of authority and ac-
countability. Displays of police authority are highly visible in the communities that 
the police patrol, but are often invisible to the institutions charged with holding the 
police accountable. Police authority often relies upon coercive components: a com-
mand presence that demands compliance and penalizes—often forcibly so—indi-
viduals who question that authority. Where the police become territorial and sus-
picious of the public, police authority degenerates into authoritarian policing, in-
creasing tensions between the police and the public. 
In 1967, one year before the Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice released its land-
mark report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.46 That report, chaired by Pres-
ident Johnson’s former Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, addressed issues of 
resistance to policing, their causes, and the challenges these present for relations 
between public and state, civilian and police.47 Most remarkably, the President’s 
Commission found that some resistance to policing was a justified response to state 
and municipal policies or practices that discriminated against minority individuals 
and communities.48 The President’s Commission concluded that as members of his-
torically marginalized and discriminated-against groups—including African-Ameri-
cans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans—marked them out as most likely to 
distrust the police because most subject to police harassment.49 
Of central importance to the President’s Commission’s response to race-
based policing is the idea that the police are an instrument of governance. A peren-
nial feature of policing is that the nature and justification of that governance func-
tion—often referred to as the “police mandate”50—is usually poorly articulated by 
the states and municipalities who oversee the police, leaving it up to the police to 
                                                                
 44. WADDINGTON, supra note 24, at 36. 
 45. Id. at 42. 
 46. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18.  
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 99 (“In view of the history of race relations in America and of the ghetto conditions in 
which most minority-group members live, doubt about American ideals and resentment against authority 
are to be expected among Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans.”). 
 50. MANNING, supra note 37, at 34. See also Peter K. Manning, Police: Mandate, Strategies, and 
Appearances in THE POLICE AND SOCIETY: TOUCHSTONE READINGS 94 (Victor E. Kappeler ed., 2d. ed., 1999). 
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determine that mandate for themselves. As a result, the police “define and redefine 
in action the mandate”51 without much external control. 
The report tackled both the need for legislatures to define the police mandate, 
but also what the substantive content of that mandate should be.52 The task, as the 
Commission envisaged matters, was to set a mandate that tempered those prac-
tices that the police considered is effective with police practices that are fair.53 As a 
foundational initial step, the Commission recognized that, despite the traditional 
emphasis is on crime and arrest, most of the time the police were engaged in other 
social governance functions, such as peacekeeping and public welfare,54 and that 
these other functions are a vital and equally valuable component of police work.55 
Peacekeeping and public-welfare policing present a number of opportunities 
and challenges, the Commission found. To consider the challenges first: because 
these aspects of policing received little attention from police, legislatures, and 
courts, the police tended to be poorly trained—if trained at all—in policing practices 
that did not involve arrest.56 The techniques of crime-fighting tend to be adversar-
ial—the activity, as described by Justice Jackson, of "the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."57 These techniques are ill-suited to 
situations in which police officers adopt a non-adversarial, community-service role. 
They “assist stranded motorists, give directions to travelers, rescue lost children, 
respond to medical emergencies, help people who have lost their keys unlock their 
apartments.”58 In these sorts of situations, the police act as traffic director, medic, 
or social worker (not crime fighter).  
More challenging are the high-visibility encounters in which an officer acts as 
stand-in for the state. Individual officers may be targeted by disadvantaged civilians 
who seek to vent their resentment for current and historical failures of the state or 
the police.59 In such circumstances, the officer should aspire to act as negotiator or 
                                                                
 51. Peter K. Manning, Drama, the Police and the Sacred in POLICING: POLITICS, CULTURE AND CONTROL 
184 (Tim Newburn & Jill Peay, eds., 2012).  
 52. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 94 (“The community acting through its elected repre-
sentatives must decide and state precisely what it wants the police to do, not simply admonishing them for 
disobeying indistinct or nonexistent commands.”). 
 53. Id. at 93 (“The struggle to maintain a proper balance between effective law enforcement and 
fairness to individuals pervades the entire criminal justice system”). 
 54. Id. at 91 (“A great majority of the situations in which policemen intervene are not, or are not 
interpreted by the police to be, criminal situations in the sense that they call for arrest with its possible 
consequences of prosecution, trial, and punishment.”). 
 55. See id. at 92 (“The peacekeeping and service, activities, which consume the majority of police 
time, receive too little consideration.”). 
 56. Id. (“policemen, who as a rule have been well trained to perform such procedures as search-
ing a person for weapons, transporting a suspect to the stationhouse, taking fingerprints, writing arrest 
reports, and testifying in court, have received little guidance from legislatures, city administrations, or their 
own superiors, in handling these intricate, intimate human situations. . . . What a policeman does, or should 
do, instead of making an arrest or in order to avoid making an arrest, or in a situation in which he may not 
make an arrest, is rarely discussed.”). 
 57. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 58. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 97. 
 59. Id. at 99–100. (“[M]inority-group residents have grievances not just against society as a 
whole, but specifically against the police. . . . [T]oo many policemen do misunderstand and are indifferent 
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conciliator. However, their training, especially if it emphasizes a strong command 
presence, tilts towards criminalizing these encounters. Poorly trained officers are 
likely to use the power of the law—or the gun or the baton—to dominate civilians. 
Instead, the President’s Commission suggested, the police should engage “under-
standingly and constructively”60 in these complex, “intricate, intimate human situ-
ations,”61 with civilians who are vulnerable, angry, and frightened.62 High visibility 
ensures that police responses are transmitted throughout the community. Those 
that are violent or demeaning reinforce negative perceptions of the police that have 
strong historical resonance and contemporary validity. 
On the other hand, the low-institutional visibility of the peacekeeping and so-
cial welfare functions renders these types of interaction difficult to regulate. Por-
tentously for the Terry Court, the Commission recognized that, despite the in-
creased judicial scrutiny of police crime-fighting activities by the courts, “most po-
lice actions are not so reviewed. Those that do not lead to arrest and prosecution 
almost never are reviewed for the simple reason that, short of a civil suit against 
the police by a citizen, there is no court machinery for reviewing them.”63 The lack 
of scrutiny has major consequences for low-level encounters between the police 
and minority civilians. Where the peacekeeping function devolves from a person-
to-person encounter between equals into a face-off between African-American (or 
other marginalized individual) versus the police—what the commission calls “black-
versus-white, oppressed-versus-oppressor”64—low visibility hides the tactics of 
street justice from the courts and other regulatory bodies.  
A major source of community friction, the President’s Commission empha-
sized, was police reliance on stops-and-frisks as a tool of dominance or oppression. 
The President’s Commission found that the race riots that exploded in American 
cities towards the end of the 1960s “were touched off by commonplace street en-
counters between policemen and citizens.”65 The problem was not criminal prose-
cution of African-Americans, but street-level harassment. In making this finding, the 
President’s Commission echoed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-
ders (commonly known as the Kerner Commission) which reported that African-
Americans “firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in 
[African-American] neighborhoods.”66 The Kerner Commission reported that 
                                                                
to minority-group aspirations, attitudes, and customs, and that incidents involving physical or verbal mis-
treatment of minority-group citizens do occur and do contribute to the resentment against police that some 
minority-group members feel.”). 
 60. Id. at 100. 
 61. Id. at 92. 
 62. See id. at 91. 
 63. Id. at 93–94 
 64. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 100. 
 65. Id. at 92. 
 66. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 158 (1968) [hereinafter CIVIL 
DISORDERS]. 
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“street justice”67—acts of excessive and unjustified use of force, harassment, and 
verbal abuse—contributed to toxic police-community relations.68 
Stopping and frisking is a high community visibility,69 low institutional visibility 
technique of policing. While the Commission recognized that police stops were an 
important investigatory tool for inquiring into criminal conduct in large, anony-
mous, urban areas.70 Nonetheless, outside of what the Terry Court would label “the 
legitimate investigative sphere[,]”71 the practice of stopping and frisking was used 
as a tool of harassment, in particular, of minorities.72 Some means of distinguishing 
between the investigatory and non-investigatory, order-producing uses of the stop 
and frisk would have to be developed, the Commission thought. But it provided lit-
tle guidance on what the distinguishing features would be.73 
The Commission’s discussion of the police mandate recognized that policing 
on patrol involves person-to-person encounters between the police and often-vul-
nerable civilians. The duty of the police to intervene to restore order or prevent 
crime. 
[M]eans becoming involved in the most intimate, personal way with the 
lives and problems of citizens of all kinds.  
 It is hard to overstate the intimacy of the contact between the police 
and the community. Policemen deal with people when they are both most 
threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are 
frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they are 
violent, or when they are ashamed. Every police action can affect in some 
way someone's dignity, or self-respect, or sense of privacy, or constitu-
tional rights.74  
The intimate and personal nature of policing suggests that managing relation-
ships with people and communities are core aspects of the police function. Yet the 
police are given too few resources to deal with the problem: they are trained in the 
process of arrest—the sort of process in which command authority to produce com-
pliance is major asset—but not of other types of intervention that could defuse or 
                                                                
 67. See, e.g., Van Maanen, supra note 32, at 143, 149. 
 68. See id. at 159 (“‘Harassment’ or discourtesy may not be the result of malicious or discrimina-
tory intent of police officers. Many officers simply fail to understand the effects of their actions because of 
their limited knowledge of the [African-American] community.”). 
 69. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 2 
(2014) (“Police stops matter. No form of direct government control comes close to these stops in sheer 
numbers, frequency, proportion of the population affected, and, in many instances, the degree of coercive 
intrusion. . . . Drivers vividly remember the details and share stories of police stops with family and friends. 
. . . Across millions of stops, these experiences are translated into common stories about who is an equal 
member of a rule-governed society and who is subjected to arbitrary surveillance and inquiry.”). 
 70. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 95. 
 71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
 72. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 95 (“the kind of misuse of field interrogation that, the 
Commission study also indicated, occurs today in a substantial number of street incidents in some cities.”). 
 73. The Commission simply opined that “[s]pecific limitations on the circumstances of a stop, the 
length of the questioning, and the grounds for a frisk would prevent th[is] kind of misuse of field interroga-
tion . . . .” Id. 
 74. Id. at 91. 
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otherwise manage situations outside the crime-fighting sphere that call for a non-
criminal response.  
Nonetheless, the intimate and personal nature of policing presented opportu-
nities for the police to make a difference in communities. On the one hand, “the 
relationship between the police and the community is so personal that every sec-
tion of the community has a right to expect that its aspirations and problems, its 
hopes and fears, are fully reflected in its police.”75 On the other, the police were 
ignorant or dismissive of the ways in which the state or society failed minority civil-
ians.76 The truly radical aspect of the Commission’s report was to include that social 
justice orientation as an explicit part of the police mandate and propose a series of 
institutional innovations to put that social justice requirement into practice.  
Two features stand out in the Commission’s social justice orientation. The first 
is the Commission’s recognition of the complex and plural sources of crime and dis-
order in American society: “[p]overty, racial antagonism, family breakdown, or the 
restlessness of young people[,]”77 to name just some of the causes identified by the 
Commission. The second feature is the Commission’s acknowledgement that the 
people staffing criminal justice positions would have to adopt a social justice orien-
tation if they were to address these legitimate social justice concerns properly.78 As 
part of that social justice orientation, the Commission recognized that the police 
would have to engage in a genuine, persistent, and permanent community relations 
mission, from the top to bottom of the police force. Community relations could not 
be a marginal aspect of policing, relegated to special programs or units:79 a commu-
nity relations orientation is, the Commission recognized, an essential feature of the 
police mandate.80 
The challenge of policing with a social justice orientation required major struc-
tural reforms. The first was to adopt a community planning board, to coordinate 
with other providers of community services to “examine whether it is . . . possible . 
. . for the police to devote more time than they now generally do to protecting the 
community against social injustices.”81 Included on this board should be a high-rank-
ing police community service officer.82 Given the patrol officer’s unique position, 
                                                                
 75. Id. at 107. 
 76. Id. (“a lack of understanding of the problems and behavior of minority groups is common to 
most police departments and is a serious deterrent to effective police work in the often turbulent neighbor-
hoods where those groups are segregated”). 
 77. Id. at 91. 
 78. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 12 (“The problem of personnel is at the root of most 
of the criminal justice system's problems. The system cannot operate fairly unless its personnel are fair. The 
system cannot operate swiftly and certainly unless its personnel are efficient and well-informed. The system 
cannot make wise decisions unless its personnel are thoughtful. In many places—many police departments, 
congested urban lower courts, the understaffed county jails, the entire prison, probation and parole appa-
ratus—more manpower is needed.”). 
 79. Though the Commission recommended the creation of a specialized community-service unit, 
commanded by a high-ranking officer, as an essential feature of the police structure. Id. at 101. 
 80. Id. (“Community relations are not exclusively a matter of special programs, but a matter that 
touches on all aspects of police work. They must play a part in the selection, training, deployment, and 
promotion of personnel”). 
 81. Id. at 98. 
 82. Id. at 101. 
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able to observe the daily life of the community, they are able to report where the 
municipality is failing to serve its residents in ways that impact social justice.83  
The second reform would transform police patrol from a monolithic enter-
prise, targeted towards crime-fighting, into one that served the community through 
public order and social welfare policing as well. Instead, the Commission proposed 
splitting the police role up into three different functions: “community service of-
ficer,” who would perform service and low-level investigative functions emphasiz-
ing personal contact with the community, and who would be unarmed;84 “police 
officer,” who would continue to perform the traditional crime-fighting and peace-
keeping roles of police patrol85; and “agent,” who would specialize in a diverse set 
of skills targeted on the distinctive needs of the community.86 The agent would not 
be confined to the ranks of the plainclothes detective, but "might be in uniform 
patrolling a high-crime or restless neighborhood.”87 The idea was to recognize the 
psychologically and socially complex nature of these types of patrol, and to value 
them as such rather than to devalue them as mere “social work.” 
The Commission’s approach to policing recognizes that there are no simple 
answers to the problems of policing because the causes of police-community con-
flict are complex, long-standing, and implicate the structure of the police force, the 
distribution of policing across the community, the techniques of policing, and the 
people who fill the ranks of the police. The police represent, to many people, the 
face of a failed and unjust state. While one way in which the police encounter the 
public—the stop and frisk—is certainly a flashpoint, the Commission treats stops 
and frisks as a symptom of a much deeper set of problems, rooted in social justice 
and institutional inability at the state and municipal level to address the needs of 
disadvantaged and marginalized communities. Indeed, the Commission proposes 
retaining and reforming stops and frisks, even as it recommends a radical series of 
reforms to address the community relations aspects of policing and promotes the 
police’s vital social justice role in the community. 
Folding these social and structural issues into a single demand for the police 
to act with constitutional “reasonableness” during an encounter or adhere to the 
standard of “probable cause” when initiating an encounter, or dispense with the 
practice of stopping and frisking in toto misses the forest for the trees. The difficult 
social, structural, and distributive issues surrounding the regulation of policing as a 
public good cannot be reduced to a single constitutional standard or policing tech-
nique. Worse, many of these problems evade constitutional scrutiny no matter 
what standard the Court selects: they are the stuff of peacekeeping, not crime-
                                                                
 83. Id. at 98 (“If a park is being badly maintained, if a school playground is locked when it is most 
needed, if garbage goes uncollected, if a landlord fails to repair or heat his building, perhaps the police could 
make it their business to inform the municipal authorities of these derelictions.”). 
 84. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 108 (“He would not have full law enforcement powers 
or carry arms”). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 102. 
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fighting, and so do not—and ought not to—make their way into the court-oriented 
system of prosecution and punishment that permits scrutiny by the courts.88 
Ironically, for a Report that insists upon the criminal justice as an integrated 
system,89 the lesson learned by the Warren Court was precisely the opposite: that 
the system is fragmented in ways that prevent important aspects of police activity 
from receiving judicial scrutiny. The Commission itself explicitly reached the conclu-
sion that police malfeasance during its peacekeeping function was often non-justi-
ciable.90 That recognition, and its criminal procedure consequences, would become 
a central feature of the Warren Court’s response to stop-and-frisk policing in Terry 
v. Ohio. 
III. THE TERRY COURT’S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION 
One way to read the Court’s opinion in Terry is as part of a conversation with 
the President’s Commission’s Report. Certainly, the President’s Commission identi-
fied the technique of stopping and frisking as major problem for police-community 
relations, and more generally as a technique of racial harassment. But suggestions 
for reform—as compared to elsewhere in the Report—were surprisingly thin. The 
Report called for retaining the practice while restricting its use. Stopping and frisk-
ing should be limited to criminal investigation, the President’s Commission con-
cluded: the task was to distinguish between “legitimate field interrogations and in-
discriminate detention and street searches of persons and vehicles.”91  
A. Ending Harassment 
The Terry Court took up the challenge of regulating stops and frisks in much 
this vein, distinguishing between permissible police conduct and “police conduct 
outside the legitimate investigative sphere.”92 The Court presented the problem of 
stopping and frisking in terms that mirrored the Commission’s language: “courts 
still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is 
over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the 
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires”93 And the Court 
                                                                
 88. See, e.g., id. at 91 (“A great majority of the situations in which policemen intervene are not, 
or are not interpreted by the police to be, criminal situations in the sense that they call for arrest with its 
possible consequences of prosecution, trial, and punishment”); id. at 92 (describing police departments as 
focused on crime-fighting and arrest, rather than “[w]hat a policeman does, or should do, instead of making 
an arrest or in order to avoid making an arrest, or in a situation in which he may not make an arrest”). 
 89. See id. at 89 (introducing a famous chart describing the segments of the criminal justice 
system in terms of an integrated whole). For a critique of this “systems analysis” approach, see BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: A CRITIQUE OF A STYLE OF JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING 1920 (2013) (“The 1967 President’s Commission is a landmark for locating criminal justice 
within a ‘system’ and for making recommendations based on the functions and objectives of the system.”). 
 90. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 10304. 
 91. Id. at 95. 
 92. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
 93. Id.  
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recognized that such harassment had a racially discriminatory and oppressive func-
tion: “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of 
which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain.”94  
The Terry Court even quoted the Commission, and its finding “that '(i)n many 
communities, field interrogations are a major source of friction between the police 
and minority groups.'”95 In fact, the Court went further, citing a recent book on po-
licing for the proposition that frisking a suspect minority suspect during a field in-
terrogation: 
cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community ten-
sions. This is particularly true in situations where the 'stop and frisk' of 
youths or minority group members is 'motivated by the officers' perceived 
need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes 
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police 
control of the streets.96 
So according to the Terry Court, the stop and frisk was a tool of racial harass-
ment, often engaged in by patrol police officers to maintain what I have called their 
“command presence” as a tool of oppression rather than legitimate police investi-
gation.97 In reaching that conclusion, the Terry Court seems to have adopted the 
same approach, in almost the same language, as the President’s commission, while 
explicitly referencing the Commission’s Report. So far, it would seem, Chief Justice 
Warren, in his Terry opinion, places the Court on the radical and racially conscious 
side of police reform.  
Indeed, Terry goes further than the Commission’s Report in its detailed fix for 
the problem of stops and frisks. Here again, it follows the Commission: the Terry 
Court retains the practice of stopping and frisking for criminal investigation and pro-
hibits it for peacekeeping or social welfare purposes (that is, as a tool for community 
relations). On the one hand, the Court reprises the Commission’s argument that 
stop and frisk is a legitimate response to the prevalence of violent crime.98 On the 
other, the Court recognizes that stopping and frisking is an impermissible form of 
intervention outside the investigative sphere.99 The Court’s response is relatively 
clear: stopping and frisking is limited in use to police investigation of crimes involv-
ing violence only.100 It is an impermissible technique for all other crimes.101  
The Court’s rule in Terry is both more detailed than the Commission’s vague 
conclusions in its Report, but also more restrictive than the major competing pro-
                                                                
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. Id. at 14 n.11. 
 96. Id. at 14 n.11 (CITING LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 7448 (1967)). 
 97. On command presence, see Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who's the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, 
Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 69398 (2009). 
 98. See PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 20 (discussing crimes of violence, including rob-
bery); id. at 102; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
 99. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 100. Id. at 27. 
 101. Id. at 29–30. 
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posals, and in particular, the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure, Tentative Draft 1,102 published in 1966, and that also made some 
recommendations about how to police stops and frisks. Like the President’s Com-
mission, the Model Code’s advisory committee comprised an elite group drawn 
from the ranks government officials, law-enforcement officers, legal practitioners, 
law professors and criminologists. The Commission was chaired by Harvard Dean 
James Vorenberg and his colleague, Paul Bator as reporters, and included, among 
other notable criminal procedure specialists, Yale Kamisar of Michigan Law 
School.103 The Model Code’s proposed regulations for the law of stops and frisks 
were much more detailed than the President’s Commission’s.104 However, the 
Model Code’s position on stops and frisks was much more police-friendly than the 
Warren Court’s.105 
The Model Code granted police officers much more leeway to use stops and 
frisks as a technique of aggressive, low-level policy.106 Under Model Code § 2.02, a 
police officer would be permitted to seize suspects and witnesses, including “per-
sons found in ‘suspicious circumstances’” and vehicles for up to twenty minutes.107 
In addition, the police could order detainees to remain at or near the place detained 
while the officer searched the detainees person “and his immediate surroundings” 
for dangerous weapons.108 The Model Code did limit the offenses justifying a stop 
to crimes that already had been committed and which were more serious than mis-
demeanors punishable by thirty days in jail.  
The Terry Court’s limitations are notable: only crimes of violence; only sus-
pects and not witnesses; no mention of vehicles (it would take the Court a further 
ten years to authorize that sort of stop109); no twenty-minute time period; no order 
to remain during that time period; and no search of objects apart from a frisk of the 
person.  
A core purpose of the President’s Commission’s Report was to end police har-
assment of minorities. And a core tool in that practice of harassment was the use 
of stop and frisks. Quite clearly, the Terry Court recognized that stopping and frisk-
ing was a tool of harassment in the context of low-visibility public order policing.110 
                                                                
 102. Evelle J. Younger, Stop and Frisk: Say it Like it is, 58 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293, app. (1968). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The rationale for stopping and frisking, however, is the same as that endorsed by the 
commission: “The authority to detain briefly on less than the reasonable cause justifying an arrest is granted 
because there are situations in which an officer may thereby determine whether he should arrest a person, 
possibly a dangerous offender, who might otherwise disappear.” 
 105. Somewhat ironically, given Kamisar’s later stance on Terry’s contribution to the Warren 
Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE 
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
 106. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 
CONN.  L. REV. 1, 52 (2010). 
 107. Younger, supra note 102. The Court, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion 
case to Terry, cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of a New York statute that sought to authorize 
detentions in addition to the stop. Id. at 60 n.20. 
 108. Younger, supra note 102 
 109. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 110. See also Sibron, 392 U.S. at 52 (“Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encoun-
tered primarily at a level of ‘low visibility’ in the criminal process.”). 
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Following the President’s Commission, the Terry Court made a clear distinction be-
tween using stops and frisks as a tool of harassment, and as a tool of police investi-
gation.  
The harassment-investigation distinction is no mere formality.111 It tracks a 
broader distinction between crime-fighting and peacekeeping also endorsed by the 
President’s Commission. That distinction, in turn, roughly tracks a worry about over-
and-under policing articulated by both the President’s Commission and the Terry 
Court.112  
Over-and-under-policing occurs when communities are victimized by the state 
in a vicious double-whammy: on the one hand, the police respond too aggressively 
to minor crime; on the other, they respond too leniently, if at all, to major crime.113 
The socially vulnerable are susceptible to targeting by the police, often as a form of 
race-based dominance; at the same time they are denied essential social resources, 
suffering “understaffed police departments, untrained officers, and other social 
capital deficits.”114  
Critiques of under-policing recognize that security from violence is an im-
portant social good provided by the state and that the crisis of security and violence 
in minority communities can amount to a failed state.115 The police are the central 
institution of governance obligated to ensure a basic level of security within our 
communities. The social ramifications of the state’s failure to provide basic secu-
rity—the vice of under-policing violent crime—are widespread and dramatic.116 Un-
der-policing is not the whole problem, but it bespeaks a wider inability to provide 
(or indifference towards) the basic guarantees of government for socially marginal-
ized communities.  
                                                                
 111. For an argument to the contrary, see Natapoff, supra note 15. 
 112. See PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 99; Terry, 392 U.S. at 15–17. 
 113. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2006) (“understand-
ing underenforcement in its own right as a potential site for distributive and democratic failure reveals that 
underenforcement is not necessarily an alternative to overenforcement but often its corollary.”). 
 114. Id. at 1730. The President’s Commission also thought of policing as a core social service: its 
response was to suggest the creation of a community planning board comprised of different municipal social 
service providers; a community relations unit for every police department staffed by a senior officer; the 
creation of community service officers specially designated to interact with vulnerable communities and 
persons; and adopting social justice and community service as an explicit feature of the police mandate. See 
supra Section II.B. 
 115. Lisa L. Miller, What’s Violence Got to Do with It? Inequality, Punishment, and State Failure in 
U.S. Politics, 17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 184, 189 (2015). (“Failed states, by definition, have largely lost the ability 
to ensure the physical safety of citizens in any systematic and predictable sense.”). See also RANDALL KENNEDY, 
RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 29 (1997) ("Deliberately withholding protection against criminality . . . is one of the 
most destructive forms of oppression that has been visited upon African-Americans.”). 
 116. Consider, for example, the fact that: “In raw numbers, more Black males were murdered 
than White males from 1989 through 1995. This a shocking fact given that Black males comprise only about 
6 percent of the population, to White males’ 32 percent.” LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT CRIME 
AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (requires a pincite) (2017). See also Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1729–30 (discussing 
underenforcement as part of a “pattern of destabilizing feedback” that harms a community’s ability to gov-
ern itself).  
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The problem many minority communities currently face has changed little 
since 1967 or 1968: extreme social deprivation,117 including extreme social vulner-
ability to violence.118 Social vulnerability is a distinguishing feature of some minor-
ity, urban neighborhoods, revealing “dramatically different living conditions for Af-
rican-Americans and whites in the most populated cities in the country [including] 
socio-economic, crime and health conditions for some black neighborhoods that 
can be characterized, without hyperbole, as a crisis.”119 These state failures limit 
residents’ ability to access social capital through education and work and inflict se-
rious psychological harm.120 Increasingly, these features of social vulnerability, 
which are experienced within minority communities, are responsible for the mas-
sive disparities in incarceration endured by minority communities.121  
Stopping and frisking occupy a central role in over-and-under-policing because 
of its function in targeting violent crime. If used appropriately, the President’s Com-
mission and the Terry Court suggest, stopping and frisking is a resource to aid in the 
investigation of serious—which for the Terry Court means violent—crime. If used 
inappropriately, it is a practice that can be used to harass minority populations as 
part of the peacekeeping process. Misdirecting stopping and frisking to pursue 
peacekeeping instead of investigating serious crimes engages in both over-policing 
public order, and under-policing serious crime. Used to harass racial minorities, 
stopping and frisking is an exemplary instance of a race-based misuse of social re-
sources.  
The way to redirect the police activity in a way that appropriately delivers 
much-needed social services122 is not to end the practice of stopping and frisking 
(so says the President’s Commission, and the Terry Court follows their analysis), but 
to force the police to use it appropriately, to investigate serious crime. The Terry 
Court, like the Commission, limits the use of stops and frisks to the process of crim-
inal investigation, and only then for criminal activity that where the officer “has 
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . 
[that is] whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be war-
ranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”123 
                                                                
 117. See, e.g., TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM (2016) (presenting a 
book-length series of arguments for the social injustice of socially isolated African-American communities). 
 118. Miller, supra note 115, at 187. 
 119. Id.   
 120. See, e.g., SHELBY, supra note 117, at 260 (discussing social and psychological harm inflicted by 
African-American social vulnerability); see also James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: 
Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 21, 51–52 (2012) (discussing interaction between violence and 
the psychological wellbeing of African-American school students).  
 121. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
126–131 (2015) (discussing the war on drugs as one of a complex series of factors driving the racially dis-
proportionate imprisonment of African-Americans); see also JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 56 (2017) (“In reality, only about 16 percent of state prison-
ers are serving time on drug charges—and very few of them, perhaps only around 5 or 6 percent of that 
group, are both low level and nonviolent); Foreman, supra note 120, at 52 (discussing the difficult questions 
that focusing on violence raises when addressing race and criminal justice). 
 122. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 121, at 1723 (discussing under-policing as a deprivation of pro-
tection for highly victimized communities). 
 123. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The standard here is an interesting—and confusing—mix 
of reasonableness and probable cause. The latter half of the quoted section, along with its various citations, 
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The dangerousness limitation naturally tracks the types of offenses that are 
under-policed: more likely violent crimes that community members would turn to 
the police to protect against. In this way, the dangerousness limitation identifies an 
important social justice interest in policing, while precluding the socially harmful 
one. The Terry Court approach has the advantage of strictly specifying the police 
interest in stopping-and-frisking: dangerousness. As the President’s Commission 
noted, “[i]f judges are to balance accurately law enforcement needs against human 
rights, the former must be articulated.”124 The Terry Court articulates those inter-
ests: safety only. The Terry Court’s rationale precludes the use of stopping and frisk-
ing as a technique of aggressive street patrol.125 These interests are clearly present 
when intervening to stop an armed robbery, and they are interests that serve, not 
only the police but also the under-policed community.   
If the police engage in stopping and frisking for public order purposes, the 
practice is, under Terry, unconstitutional harassment, especially if it is harassment 
of racial minorities. Indeed, the Terry Court explicitly rejects the State of Ohio’s ar-
gument that 
the police should be allowed to 'stop' a person and detain him briefly for 
questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with criminal activ-
ity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should have 
the power to 'frisk' him for weapons. If the 'stop' and the 'frisk' give rise to 
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then 
the police should be empowered to make a formal 'arrest,' and a full inci-
dent 'search' of the person. This scheme is justified [by the State of Ohio] 
in part upon the notion that a 'stop' and a 'frisk' amount to a mere 'minor 
inconvenience and petty indignity,' which can properly be imposed upon 
the citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a 
police officer's suspicion.126 
The Terry Court explicitly rejected this “minor intrusion” theory of policing, as a 
form of over-policing that failed to protect minority civilians.127  
Indeed, the Court suggested that, considered in the context of “friction” be-
tween minority communities and the police, “the degree of community resentment 
aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of 
                                                                
articulates the probable cause standard. See id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174176 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). 
 124. PRESIDENT'S COMM’N, supra note 18, at 94. The President’s Commission was quite skeptical 
about anecdotal law-enforcement accounts of their interests, suggesting that the police “establish through 
empirical research what the needs of law enforcement are [so that] they can enumerate policies and pre-
scribe practices that meet those needs.” Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60 (1968). Sibron addresses the constitutionality 
of New York’s stop-and-frisk statute, but only considers an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 
the law. The Court nonetheless reject the claim that the statute operates as a blanket authorization to en-
gage in peacekeeping-style stops and frisks, arguing that such a license would violate the Fourth Amend-
ment in a number of respects. See id. at 61. 
 126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10–11. 
 127. Id. at 16–17 (calling the minor intrusion view “fantastic”); and see id. at 16 n.12 (endorsing 
the view of the Ohio State Supreme Court that the frisk may not be used to find evidence).  
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the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security caused by those 
practices.”128 But if the stop is demanded by the risk of violence, then the police 
appear to be extending the social service they are historically most often accused 
of withholding: they would be under-policing. The emphasis on violence as the trig-
ger for a lawful stop and frisk thus makes real sense against the backdrop of the 
Court’s bifurcation of policing into criminal investigating versus peacekeeping.  
B. The Limits of Justiciability 
The Terry Court’s most important insight is its most overlooked. Policing is a 
complex, plural, and fragmented business. The police reflect that complexity. Some 
are uniformed, some are plain clothed.129 Some specialize in the investigation of 
specific, serious crimes; others are generalists, ready to cope with whatever comes 
their way.130 Among uniformed officers: some specialize in responding to riots or 
using special weapons and tactics;131 others patrol the streets by foot or in a car, 
responding to calls for help or aggressively stopping and frisking passersby. 
Terry v. Ohio paid particular attention to the plural and fragmented functions 
of police officers who are engaged in patrolling a particular neighborhood to be on 
the lookout for crime or other sources of disorder or distress.132 These are not the 
only types of police officers, and patrolling is only one of a myriad of activities in 
which the police engage on a daily basis. Nonetheless, patrol is the high-visibility 
backdrop against which most members of the public consciously interact with the 
police: indeed, against which most members of the public interact with the state. 
However, addressing aggressive patrol and custodial encounters, without in-
cluding other police business, misses out on a lot of what the patrol officer does on 
the street, day to day. The Terry Court recognized that a lot of street policing was 
not the sort of crime-fighting oriented towards the criminal prosecution of offend-
ers. 
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incred-
ibly rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges 
of pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confron-
tations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. 
Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of 
them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different 
turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the con-
versation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety 
of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to 
prosecute for crime.133 
                                                                
 128. Id. at 17 n.14. 
 129. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 57 (1994). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., JEAN-PAUL BRODEUR, THE POLICING WEB 139–40 (2010); see also id. at 17–43. Brodeur 
discusses the vast number of institutions, including the public police, that perform policing tasks, as the 
“police assemblage.”  
 132. WADDINGTON, supra note 24, at 6 (1994) (“The traditional weapon in the police armoury de-
signed to prevent crime is patrolling.”). 
 133. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. 
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In fact, it turns out that very little of what the police do is actually crime-
fighting. The overwhelming majority of a beat officer's time is spent waiting, wan-
dering, dealing with public welfare issues (such as helping people who are lost or 
who need medical aid) or public order issues (such as breaking up minor fights or 
quieting noisy neighbors): 
Patrol officers spend the [majority] of their time discouraging be-
havior that officers view as disruptive or unseemly, such as drunks 
sleeping in front of doorways, teenage boys lollygagging on a 
street corner, prostitutes soliciting in a blue-collar residential 
neighborhood, or men urinating against a wall around the corner 
from a busy bar.134 
Terry rejects the idea that the criminal justice system is an integrated whole 
organized around the process catching criminals and gathering evidence to prose-
cute and punish them. The Terry Court recognizes that criminal justice “system” is 
not one, integrated, system of governance, but multiple overlapping ones. That is 
the message of the Court’s bifurcation of policing into criminal investigation and 
peacekeeping functions. In asserting this distinction, the Court identifies a feature 
of policing, and the criminal justice system more generally, that is a staple of polic-
ing studies, but one that has generally been overlooked in the Fourth Amendment 
literature: often—and particularly in their peacekeeping role—the police are un-
concerned with the formal system of prosecution and punishment.  
 As the Terry Court puts it: 
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions 
is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest 
in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest 
of serving some other goal.135 
Until Terry, the Court mostly assumed that the fruits of police activity proceed 
in an orderly fashion from searches and seizures on the street, to interrogations in 
the stationhouse, to prosecutions in the courthouse.136 The problem addressed by 
Terry is that there is lots of police activity that does not proceed in this orderly and 
court-directed manner. Lots of police activity begins and ends on the street. The 
goal is not a criminal conviction: it is to project police authority and control public 
activity on the streets. This sort of police activity is incredibly diverse: 
                                                                
 134. BAYLEY, supra note 129, at 17.  
 135. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14. 
 136. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“When the constitutional validity of an arrest 
is challenged, it is the function of a court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the 
moment of the arrest would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense has been 
committed. If the court is not informed of the facts upon which the arresting officers acted, it cannot 
properly discharge that function.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
46061 (1966) (“The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period of 
custodial interrogation. . . . We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal 
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.”). 
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police conduct may, for example, be designed simply to help an intoxicated 
person find his way home, with no intention of arresting him unless he 
becomes obstreperous. Or the police may be seeking to mediate a domes-
tic quarrel which threatens to erupt into violence. They may accost a 
woman in an area known for prostitution as part of a harassment campaign 
designed to drive prostitutes away without the considerable difficulty in-
volved in prosecuting them. Or they may be conducting a dragnet search 
of all teenagers in a particular section of the city for weapons because they 
have heard rumors of an impending gang fight.137 
All of these activities begin and end on the street: sometimes by moving peo-
ple off or along the street, sometimes by confiscating contraband, often by putting 
people in their place.138 This sort of low-level social control cannot be regulated 
through court-centered criminal processes, because police activity is over when or-
der is restored. Criminal defendants cannot assert their Fourth Amendment rights 
before a judge because there is no criminal case to be brought. No civil cases ripen, 
so long as police harassment is kept below a certain level of brutality. As a conse-
quence, these types of police encounter are invisible under the Fourth Amend-
ment’s court oriented exclusionary scheme. 
To be sure, sometimes the police participate in aggressive patrols or face high-
stakes encounters with the public. For the most part, however, the police intervene 
in domestic disputes, manage traffic accidents and snarl-ups, respond to medical 
emergencies, perform noise abatement duties, check unsecured residences and 
business, and undertake a myriad of other public order and “community caretak-
ing” activities.139 These activities often require the police to engage with distressed, 
inebriated, obstreperous, vulnerable, individuals who may welcome or resent po-
lice interference.140 When engaged in this sort of activity, police officers must ex-
hibit some mix of patience, courage, leadership, diplomacy, tolerance, wisdom and 
strength,141 sometimes all at once and in stressful situations. 
Criminal procedure scholars tend to think of policing in terms of the way the 
Constitution permits or restricts certain police practices; and more narrowly, in 
terms of a crime-fighting model that worries about what rights may be asserted by 
criminal suspects against the police. Often, Fourth Amendment doctrine treats beat 
policing as uniform and undifferentiated activity where the police are engaged in 
                                                                
 137. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 n.9. 
 138. See, e.g., WADDINGTON, supra note 24, at 45. Waddington argues that the police impose order 
that recognizes local variations in acceptable behavior, so that “respectable order is maintained provided 
skid-row bums and prostitutes remain in their territorial place. . . .  
 Peddlers and street musicians, sidewalk drinking, and dense late-night foot traffic can 
be tolerated in the right places, just as the antics long associated with Mardi Gras and Hallow-
een are appropriate at the right time.‘“ 
Id. (quoting WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 9 (1990)). As the quote from Terry recognizes, sometimes 
this activity escalates into an arrest and even a prosecution. But prosecution is a contingent feature of the 
activities listed in the long quotation from Terry, not the point of those activities.  
 139. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (discussing caretaking role); Debra Liv-
ingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, (1998). 
 140. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 139, at 272.  
 141. See M.R. HABERFELD, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE TRAINING 1 (2002). 
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the often “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”142 Yet most of what 
counts as policing is “low visibility:”143 out of sight of the courts that could enforce 
these constitutional regulations. In part, that low visibility depends upon a form of 
social control that begins and ends on the street. 
A central insight of the Terry Court was that low-level harassment was not 
justiciable through the criminal justice process. 
The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, 
of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will 
not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. . . 
. [A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule [is a] futile 
protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to con-
trol.144 
IV. TERRY’S CRITICS 
The central insight of the Terry Court is that the criminal justice system is not 
really one system, but a set of overlapping and plural systems. In this fragmented 
criminal justice universe, regulating the police—and other criminal justice actors—
is really complex. While the courts, the prosecutors, and the police are members of 
the same legal system, the law does not regulate each in the same way. Different 
state agents—judges, prosecutors, and police—have different roles, each subject 
to different modes of regulation by different regulatory bodies with different com-
petences. Within the police, different types of officers do different jobs. For the 
most part, detectives investigate discrete crimes through episodic interactions with 
a relatively few individuals, whereas patrol officers impose order, in public, across 
communities. Crime-fighting is oriented towards criminal prosecutions, and so de-
tectives—and the patrol police who arrest civilians or collect evidence—are most 
likely to interact with prosecutors and courts. But for the most part, the patrol of-
ficers’ public order policing begins and ends on the streets. As far as prosecutors 
and the courts are concerned, this type of policing is low visibility and difficult to 
regulate.  
The problem of fragmented criminal justice should generate a second insight: 
that other, more traditional forms of institutional reform are better than piecemeal 
reform through criminal defendants. Instead of relying on criminal prosecutions as 
proxy civil rights cases, it might be better just to bring civil rights cases directly 
against the police. That was the recommendation, after all, of the President’s Com-
mission. However, that avenue was foreclosed in three major cases in the 1970s, 
two of which directly concerned the police.145 In a lot of ways, Terry bears the brunt 
of this failure of systemic police reform.  
                                                                
 142. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 143. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52 (1968) (Sibron was a companion case to Terry); see 
also Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the 
Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960). 
 144. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968). 
 145. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). Goode and Davis were both policing cases. 
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A. Fragmented Criminal Justice 
In the context of the criminal justice system, convictions orient policing to-
wards crime-fighting: an arrest begins a criminal process culminating in a trial or a 
plea-bargain. However, the police may also treat arrests as oriented towards ad-
ministrative targets set by the police themselves.146 The goal is administrative clo-
sure: satisfying the administrative metrics necessary to gain institutional credit for 
official actions relevant to some case (whether or not the case is taken up by a pros-
ecutor).147 Whatever happens after that does not affect the fact that the arrest was 
made.148 Finally, the police may intervene with the public, including by making ar-
rests, simply to extend law-enforcement contacts with the public.149 The contact 
metric recognizes that a lot of law enforcement is concerned with marking out and 
supervising individuals.150 Such activities need not result in an arrest or a conviction. 
Of course, a contact can result in an administrative arrest leading to conviction. But 
the processes need not progress in this neat or linear fashion and the different types 
of intervention—contact, administrative intervention, and criminal prosecution—
are independently valuable means of disposing of criminal offenders. 
Attending to the institutional structure of the criminal justice system reveals 
a fragmented, plural, and competing set of administrative agencies, each with its 
own separate sphere of influence, goals, and incentives, some of which are at best 
tangentially related to criminal conviction. A fragmented model of criminal justice 
suggests that the police, prosecutors, and the courts often have a more complicated 
relationship with each other than that of inferior and superior in an integrated in-
stitutional hierarchy. Rules that apply in or to one organization may not apply in a 
direct or easily enforceable manner to other organizations.151 Fragmentation of this 
                                                                
 146. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363, 376–78 (1999) (discussing why the police metric of “collars” or arrest rates are not particularly influ-
enced by the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial. 
 147. Id.  
 148. For example, celebrated criminologist Jerome Skolnick discusses the way the police use 
clearance rates to assess performance. The clearance rate is a “police organizational term bearing no direct 
relation to the administration of criminal law . . . [i.e.,] statistics on arrest and prosecution.” JEROME H. 
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 168 (4th ed. 2011). Rather, it is the 
metric by which officers measure each other’s and the institution’s performance. Id. A clearance does not 
depend upon some feature of the criminal justice system outside the officer’s control, such as conviction at 
trial or by plea bargain. 
 149. Jeffry A. Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Polic-
ing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 547550 (2016) (discussing low-level control features such as information 
gathering that need not involve contact with civilians); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of 
Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2061 (2017) (discussing social control function of criminal justice 
system); AMY E. LERMAN, & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN 
CRIME CONTROL (2014). 
 150. See note 149 and accompanying text. See also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: 
Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 351, 644 (2013) (discussing the use of criminal justice sys-
tem to mark, rather than convict, criminals as part of system of low-level social control documenting the 
frequency of police contacts). 
 151. Slobogin, supra note 146, at 383 (discussing police officer’s refusal to comply with norms 
they think are unfair). 
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sort shapes and limits the structures of influence that nominal superiors exercise 
over their putative subordinates.152  
Even this separate-spheres model may understate the problems of regulating 
law-enforcement through judicially-generated norms of criminal procedure. Frag-
mentation may exist, not only between, but also within a criminal justice institution. 
For example, criminal justice theorists widely accept that there is a rift between the 
goals and interests of “management” cops and “street” cops working in the same 
department.153  
Fragmented institutions tend to develop alternative normative perspectives 
that compete with the perspectives of other institutions or officials whose jurisdic-
tion overlaps theirs. The police may regard constitutional interpretations developed 
by the judiciary,154 or rules of conduct regulating street patrol,155 as overly technical 
and unresponsive to the substance of policing. Rather than seeking to comply with 
such norms, law-enforcement officials may honor the letter but not the spirit, or 
worse, ignore or subvert them. Accordingly, patrol officers may treat incentives to 
make administrative arrests or engage social control in ways that compete with and 
confound the norms established by their superiors inside the police force and the 
prosecutors and courts that seek to influence their conduct. 
The trial- or conviction-oriented regulation may just miss a lot of what policing 
is about. Regulation through exclusion of evidence applies well to criminal investi-
gation oriented towards trials and convictions. But it does not obviously apply to 
administrative arrest goals or low-level social control, where criminal prosecution 
is at best a byproduct of the policing regime. That is the central insight of Terry. The 
exclusionary rule regulates criminal investigation more-or-less effectively by deny-
ing law enforcement officials the use (at trial) of the evidence they have gathered 
(on the street). But the exclusionary rule does not work to regulate police conduct 
if no evidence is gathered, because there is no evidence to exclude.  
Worse, the classic move of the Warren Court—to use the criminal defendant 
as a proxy for the rights of all civilians—does not work if the defendant is not pros-
ecuted but released on the street. The Fourth Amendment protects the public one 
defendant at a time, by using individual cases to set the limits of police conduct. 
Three features of this process are worth emphasizing: first, there are no proxies 
without criminal prosecutions. If the system of criminal justice is one of “street jus-
tice,” in which civilians are targeted and punished without prosecution, there are 
no cases through which to regulate the police. Criminal justice fragmentation places 
lots of police conduct beyond the ability of the courts to remedy because the courts 
never get to see it. 
                                                                
 152. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003) (discussing police and prosecutors as sharing a “bilateral monopoly” over the 
investigative process); Slobogin, supra note 146, at 394 (describing inability of superiors to enforce rules as 
a systemic deterrent on patrol police conduct).  
 153. Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni & F.A.J. Ianni, Street Cops and Management Cops-The Two Cultures of 
Policing, in CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANIZATION 251 (Maurice Punch ed., 1983).  
 154. Slobogin, supra note 146 at 757–58. For some worries about whether the police properly 
understand the constitutional rules that apply to their conduct, see Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training about 
Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inadequate, 7 POL’Y STUD. J. 461–468 (1978) (discussing transmission of 
constitutional norms to officers through training). 
 155. Id. at 383. 
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The problem of the low-judicial visibility of most policing is a deep one. On the 
one hand, it means that the courts are likely to be ignorant of many of the tactics 
that the police use on the street. Only the most high-visibility public order policing 
practices are likely to register. Stop and frisk as a category of mass policing becomes 
high-visibility because of its widespread use as a form of criminal investigation. 
Other tactics remain low visibility and outside the ken of the courts, even though 
they may be as destructive of community life as stopping and frisking. Even stops 
and frisk become invisible when they are used only intermittently as a technique of 
public order policing: that is, at lower rates than in jurisdictions like New York and 
Chicago. The Fourth Amendment, and indeed the whole system of criminal prose-
cution, is a poor tool to bring problematic police tactics to light. 
What matters, at this level, are governance decisions about the goals of polic-
ing, whom to police, and the sorts of techniques to use to police them. For the pub-
lic order policing, what matters are contacts rather than arrests: both the nature of 
those contacts and how they are distributed across communities. It has taken a re-
ally long time for Fourth Amendment focused criminal procedure jurisprudence to 
catch up to this fact.  
Where the jurisprudence has caught up, sometimes the claim is that these 
contacts are not covered by the constitution but are part of the police's community 
caretaking role, and so are wholesale permissible. Others claim that such contacts 
are constitutionally unreasonable because individual decisions about whom to po-
lice implicitly or explicitly engages the discrimination harm of race-based targeting, 
and so are retail impermissible constitutional violations.  
Both arguments miss the fact that criminal prosecution is a contingent feature 
of this sort of policing: the goal is a contact that begins and ends on the street, not 
one that ends up in the courthouse. A style of regulation that depends upon crimi-
nal defendants as proxies for the people who are targeted will fail to register this 
type of policing. 
Many of the bad things that the police do are not even Fourth Amendment 
wrongs. As the President's Commission recognized, the features of an encounter 
that may most matter to the civilian are associated with the demeanor of the of-
ficer, and her disrespectful treatment during an interaction that may completely 
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The frisk is a particularly intru-
sive and humiliating aspect of these interactions; but frisking is not the only way to 
stigmatize the public.  
A focus on defendants who are subject to criminal prosecution necessarily 
minimizes these slights. Partly, discourtesy seems insignificant compared to even 
very low-level criminal activity.  But even if discourtesy was relevant to the harm of 
disproportionately “targeting” certain groups for differential treatment (a “discrim-
ination” harm), such discourtesy is only punishable if the case comes to trial. Most 
policing, as a form of social control, depends primarily upon contacts between the 
police and public, rather than criminal prosecution. These contacts are much more 
frequent than prosecution, and their reverberations spread just as widely through-
out the community. In most of these public order and low-level criminal contacts, 
the police decline to prosecute. That does not entail that the police failed to mete 
out a form of street justice. It means only that the process of policing stays hidden 
from the courts. 
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B. The Failure of Systemic Reform 
There is a much better system of criminal justice regulation and reform that 
does not depend upon criminal prosecution. That system would use widespread 
injunctive relief to mandate top-to-bottom reform of state and local police forces. 
This sort of injunctive relief was both typical of civil rights reform throughout the 
1970s and is well tailored to accomplishing the sort of reforms identified in the Pres-
ident's Commission.  
Tragically, however, the Court rejected this sort of police reform in three ma-
jor cases that denied criminal defendants the power to demand reform of structur-
ally racist police departments: the sort reform of the sort of departments targeted 
by the President's Commission. The Court's justification for distinguishing police tar-
gets from other civil rights litigants was lack of standing: the claim that injunctive 
relief was unavailable because the litigants were unable to demonstrate that the 
injury was likely to be repeated.  
A focus on the Fourth Amendment overlooks a range of race-based policing 
cases, about the structural reform of policing than never make it into our policing 
canon. Three from the 1970s concern the subject-matter of the President's Com-
missions reform agenda.156 In none of them does the Supreme Court mention, let 
alone continue its conversation with, the President's Commission. Yet at the trial 
phase, federal district courts, citing the President’s Commission recognized that the 
central issue raised by the plaintiffs was that presented by the President’s Commis-
sion: reforming the police in a manner that could address the expanded mandate 
of community justice.157 
In all of these cases, plaintiffs asserted comprehensive racial discrimination on 
the part of the state or municipal criminal justice apparatus. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 
for example, the plaintiffs were civil rights protesters who were arrested and pros-
ecuted. They alleged that the whole criminal justice system, from the Police Com-
missioner to the municipal court judges, “deliberately applied [the criminal laws and 
procedures] more harshly to black residents of Cairo and inadequately applied to 
white persons who victimize blacks, to deter respondents from engaging in their 
lawful attempt to achieve equality.”158  
The problem identified by the Littleton plaintiffs was precisely the sort identi-
fied by the President’s Commission: as Justice Douglas put matters in his dissent:  
 What has been alleged here is . . . a recurring pattern of wrongs which 
establishes, if proved, that the legal regime under control of the whites in 
Cairo, Illinois, is used over and over again to keep the blacks from exercis-
ing First Amendment rights, to discriminate against them, to keep from the 
blacks the protection of the law in their lawful activities, to weight the 
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scales of justice repeatedly on the side of white prejudices and against 
black protests, fears, and suffering. This is a more pervasive scheme for 
suppression of blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen.159 
In rejecting their claim, the Supreme Court found that the civil rights protest-
ers lacked standing to challenge the police and courts because they lacked standing: 
they were not currently on trial for as a result of the discriminatory practices they 
had identified;160 and in any event, the Court thought that the requested relief—
having the federal judiciary supervise ongoing criminal cases—ensured that state 
proceedings were not racially biased.161 
While the claims in Littleton were primarily addressed against two municipal 
court judges,162 the claims in the next two cases were asserted directly against the 
police. In Rizzo v. Goode,163 
 The central thrust of respondents’ efforts in the two trials was to lay 
a foundation for equitable intervention, in one degree or another, because 
of an assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreat-
ment by police officers. This mistreatment was said to have been directed 
against minority citizens in particular and against all Philadelphia residents 
in general.164 
Once again, the Supreme Court denied standing. Once again, the Court opined 
that the link between the individual complainants and the pattern of police miscon-
duct was too tenuous: the named plaintiffs could not show that they, personally, 
would be affected by police misconduct, even if other members of the group they 
represented might be.165 Worse, the Court noted that the types of discriminatory 
conduct alleged by the plaintiffs was typical of police departments around the coun-
try. Quoting one of the trial courts’ opinions, the Supreme Court noted that 
there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was dif-
ferent in kind or degree from that which exists elsewhere; indeed, the Dis-
trict Court found “that the problems disclosed by the record . . . are fairly 
typical of (those) afflicting police departments in major urban areas.”166 
There is a brutal irony in this part of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court.  
The typical problems are just those disclosed by the President’s Commission: as the 
trial court noted:  
Two presidential commissions have addressed themselves extensively to 
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these issues: The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1967), at pp. 178-207 (in 
which, incidentally, the Philadelphia Highway Patrol is described as a 
“skull-cracking division”); Report of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, Ch. 11 (1968). A review of this material suggests that the 
problems disclosed by the record in the present case are not new, and are 
fairly typical of the problems afflicting police departments in major urban 
areas.167 
While the district court engaged in an explicit conversation with the Presi-
dent’s Commission, using its findings to emphasize the racially disparate and violent 
nature of policing in Philadelphia, the Supreme Court squashed and ignored that 
discussion. Instead of emphasizing the social justice mandate of the police, the 
Court instead emphasized that discriminatory policing was typical of the American 
criminal justice system. Instead of calling for a race-based transformation, the Court 
entrenched the discriminatory practices of individual officers, simply because their 
superiors had played no “affirmative part” in producing the discrimination.168 As 
Justice Blackmun complained in dissent, the Court refused to do anything to correct 
systemic police “violations of citizens’ constitutional rights, of a pattern of that type 
of activity, of its likely continuance and recurrence, and of an official indifference as 
to doing anything about it.”169 
Six months after the Court decided Goode, it struck a further blow to police 
reform. At the heart of the reform movement was the transformation of the police 
department by overhauling its recruitment and training practices. Criminal proce-
dure scholars tend to think of policing in terms of the way the Constitution permits 
or restricts certain police practices; and more narrowly, in terms of a crime-fighting 
model that worries about what rights may be asserted by criminal suspects against 
the police. Of much more importance to policing are the rules and policy decisions 
affecting who gets to be a police officer and what training they receive.170  
Police selection and training tells us a lot about who we think the police are 
and what we think they do. We select people because they possess certain physical, 
psychological, and characterological capabilities we believe are tailored to the job: 
skills or other competencies that they currently possess or that we can train them 
to possess by the time they graduate. The criteria we use to screen individuals into 
and out of the police tell us a lot about our own understanding of the police role 
and functions.  
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The core case on police selection and training is Washington v. Davis.171 That 
case examined whether the District of Columbia’s Municipal Police Department en-
gaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices.172 Davis ad-
dressed the standards that the Municipal Police Department used to screen out 
candidates for training as a police officer. In Davis, the core battle was over the 
impact of a Test 21, a test applied to all applicants for civil service positions in the 
federal government, police and civilians alike.173  
Davis is often overlooked in discussions of policing—it is often characterized 
solely as a Title VII and civil rights case. Davis was, however, a police selection and 
training case. Hidden within the equal protection elements of Davis is a battle over 
the standards used to select and train the officers serving in the D.C. Metropolitan 
Police Department, and so to characterize what criteria are definitive of policing on 
the street.  
The plaintiff claimed Test 21, which tested verbal ability, vocabulary, reading 
and comprehension, and logical reasoning,174 was not tailored to test police activity. 
Instead, the test applied more generally to every public official, not just the police—
a claim supported by the fact that the test was developed by the Civil Service Com-
mission, not the Police Department. Because African-Americans disproportionately 
failed the test as compared to Whites,175 plaintiffs claimed that the test had a dis-
criminatory impact upon that class of applicants. Under pre-existing Supreme Court 
doctrine, such an impact could only be permitted by a showing of job-relatedness: 
whether the test tracked the requirements of police training or police activity in the 
field.176 Because Test 21 did not track police work in the field, Davis argued, and 
because African-Americans failed the test at disproportionate rates, then the test 
discriminated on the basis of race and therefore violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution, and various anti-discrimination statutes. 
The district court, in ruling against the plaintiffs, rejected a monolithic, crime-
fighting conception of the police role, one that ignored the social welfare aspects 
of policing on the street. Instead, the district court cited to the President’s Commis-
sion, suggesting that  
[l]aw enforcement is a highly skilled professional service. The ability to 
swing a nightstick no longer measures a policeman’s competency for his 
exacting role in this city. . . . 
 . . . 
 . . .The training program . . . needs to emphasize different aspects of 
a policeman’s complex responsibilities are perceived. The day may soon be 
at hand when a college degree will be a prerequisite and advancement will 
depend in large part upon graduate degree experience. The FBI and the 
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military have moved in this direction, and the President’s Crime Commis-
sion has urged that police recruiting and training take this course.177 
The district court thus emphasized one half of the President’s Commission’s 
recruiting reforms: more college-educated students. Although the district court ig-
nored another alternative—hiring community service officers without even a high-
school diploma. However, the President’s Commission had recognized that stand-
ardized written tests reflecting “rigid higher education standards” posed a problem 
for potential minority recruits educated in still-desegregating education systems.178 
Minority candidates were less likely to have a high school diploma, and so stand-
ardized tests would likely screen out such candidates even though they could have 
engaged in many police tasks. Furthermore, the President’s Commission on Law En-
forcement thought that minority recruits were particularly important to law-en-
forcement’s community relations function: minority officers could serve as media-
tors between the police and the minority community. That function appeared par-
ticularly important given the recent racial and political unrest culminating in a series 
of riots across the country.  
The President’s Commission had, for example, proposed an alternative route 
to entry into the police, by which individuals who could not satisfy the written exam 
would nonetheless be admitted as Community Support Officers: essentially a lower 
position, bereft of a firearm but also not requiring clerical work.179 The Community 
Support Officer would focus on community relations, but the position could also 
function as an apprenticeship to a full police officer position for some individuals 
admitted through this route.180 The Davis plaintiffs did not adopt this proposal or 
propose some other alternative recruiting stream into the police. Instead, they 
simply wished to dispense with the written test altogether as irrelevant to police 
activity.  
These radical suggestions are mostly forgotten. Instead, the story of the last 
forty years has been, for the most part, a loosening of judicial controls on the police 
and an abandonment of federal attempts to promote root and branch reform of 
police training. As a result, police training in America has failed to follow through 
on many of the more radical and progressive insights and recommendations of the 
past, but has instead concentrated on increasing a soft liberal agenda of diversity, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Terry doctrine and the extended use of stopping and frisking as a means 
of harassing minority community members has been the subject of much percep-
tive criticism over the past fifty years. But in criticizing the doctrine, many scholars 
have lost sight of the most perceptive aspects of the case. These include the Terry 
Court’s important insight that the criminal justice system is fragmented among 
many institutions, with overlapping but competing interests. No one institution, 
and no one technique of regulation could hope to control them all; and that is es-
pecially true of such an internally fragmented institution as the police. 
 
